Is there trickle-down from tech? Poverty, employment, and the high-technology multiplier in U.S. cities by Lee, Neil & Rodríguez-Pose, Andrés
  
Neil Lee and Andrés Rodríguez-Pose 
Is there trickle-down from tech? Poverty, 
employment and the high-technology 
multiplier in US cities 
 
Article (Accepted version) 
(Refereed) 
 
 
 Original citation: Lee, Neil and Rodríguez-Pose, Andrés (2016) Is there trickle-down from tech? Poverty, employment and the high-technology multiplier in US cities. Annals of the Association of 
American Geographers, 106 (5). pp. 1114-1134. ISSN 0004-5608 
DOI: 10.1080/24694452.2016.1184081 
 
 
© 2016 by American Association of Geographers 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/66296/ 
Available in LSE Research Online: August 2016 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the School. 
Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors 
and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any article(s) in LSE 
Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. You may not 
engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities or any 
commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE Research 
Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be differences 
between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the publisher’s version 
if you wish to cite from it. 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
Is there trickle-down from tech? Poverty, employment 
and the high-technology multiplier in US cities 
 
Neil Lee and Andrés Rodríguez-Pose 
Department of Geography and Environment 
London School of Economics 
Houghton St 
London WC2A 2AE, UK 
 
Forthcoming in Annals of the Association of American Geographers 
 
Abstract 
High-technology industries are seen as important in helping urban economies thrive, but 
at the same time they are often considered as potential drivers of poverty and social 
exclusion. However, little research has assessed how high-tech affects urban poverty and 
the wages of workers at the bottom of the pyramid. This paper addresses this gap in the 
literature and investigates the relationship between employment in high-tech industries, 
poverty and the labour market for non-degree educated workers using a panel of 295 
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) in the United States between 2005 and 2011. The 
results of the analysis show no real impact of the presence of high-technology industries 
on poverty. Yet there is strong evidence that tech-employment increases wages for non-
degree educated workers and, to a lesser extent, employment for those without degrees. 
These results suggest that while tech employment has some role in improving welfare for 
non-degree educated workers, tech-employment alone is not be enough to reduce 
poverty.  
 
Keywords: High-technology industries, employment, wages, poverty, cities 
JEL: R11, R12, R58 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
Data accessed through the Integrated Public Use Microdata (IPUMS) Service at the 
University of Minnesota. Alix Cocude provided excellent research assistance on this 
project, while Callum Wilkie drew the maps. The authors appreciate the financial support 
of the European Research Council under the European Union’s Seventh Framework 
Programme (FP7/2007-2013)/ERC grant agreement nº 269868. 
 
  
2 
 
1. Introduction 
 
High-technology industries are seen as a vital part of the new economy. Tech firms have 
the potential to achieve economies of scale, high productivity levels, and rapid growth. 
For those employed in the sector, tech-companies create high-skilled and very well-paid 
jobs. Even controlling for factors such as education and experience, workers in ‘tech’ 
earn a premium of around 17 percent relative to workers in other sectors (Hathaway & 
Kallerman, 2012). These industries are also geographically concentrated: many of the 
‘superstar’ cities of the world economy – famously, Silicon Valley – have thriving tech-
sectors (Currid & Connolly, 2008; Bieri, 2010). High-tech firms have also been regarded 
as powerful generators of indirect jobs. Moretti (2010) found a ‘tech multiplier’ 
equivalent to almost 5 new jobs for each additional high-tech job in a local economy. All 
these benefits make high-tech sectors extremely attractive for cities and regions. Areas 
with tech-sectors are regarded as the example to follow. As a consequence, national, 
state, and city-level policymakers the world over have become fascinated by high-tech 
and devoted considerable resources to both creating and attracting tech firms (Fallah et 
al., 2014). 
 
The economic importance of the sector, its spatial concentration, and the policy 
emphasis to attract this type of firms raise an important question: who gains from the 
growth of tech-employment in a city? An optimistic body of research stresses that the 
benefits from high-tech go well beyond those employed in the sector, reaching out to the 
rest of the city and playing an important role in not only generating overall growth, but 
also reducing poverty. Sachs (2003), for example, suggests that innovation and new 
technology has the potential to significantly reduce overall poverty, while Glasmeier 
(1991) has documented the importance of high-technology industries in tackling poverty 
in disadvantaged rural economies. And the ‘knowledge spillovers’ generated by the sector 
are perceived to benefit entrepreneurs and workers in other sectors, with their wages 
increasing as a result (Echeverri-Carroll and Ayala, 2009). 
 
However, this optimistic take on the impact of high-tech is far from dominant. Different 
strands of research take a more pessimistic view and some classic studies of cities with 
strong tech-economies have often suggested a darker side to high-tech growth. Thirty 
years ago Saxenian (1984) already highlighted the presence of a divided labour market in 
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Silicon Valley. A decade later Harrison (1994: 309) suggested that the success of Silicon 
Valley was in part driven by inequality and stratified local labour markets, which were 
“studiously ignored” in boosterist economic narratives. More recently, Florida (2005) has 
noted the high and growing levels of inequality in Silicon Valley. Direct employment in 
high-technology industries tend to require high levels of education (Hecker, 2005). These 
studies suggest that tech-employment is unlikely to benefit those at risk of poverty and 
that tech-led growth will instead result in inequality.  Similar concerns are reflected by 
work by Sassen (2005), who argued that the dominant global cities of the world economy 
had increasingly polarized employment structures, with low-wage service workers 
employed to service the affluent workers in the urban elite. 
 
Yet, despite the wide body of research on the tech sector, most work dealing with its 
impact on poverty and inequality has been conducted on individual or a comparison of 
case studies. Limited research has considered the impact of high-tech employment on 
poverty across a broad range of cities.  This paper addresses this gap through an analysis 
of the link between high-technology employment, on the one hand, and poverty and the 
evolution of wages of the low-skilled, on the other, in US cities for the period between 
2005 and 2011. Our principal research question is whether growth in high-technology 
industries is associated with a reduction in poverty. We also investigate the impact of 
high-technology employment on the labour market for those without degree level 
qualifications. We do this using the American Community Survey (ACS), a survey giving 
data on 295 Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs, henceforth ‘cities’) in the United 
States. We focus first on the links between innovation, high-technology and poverty, 
before considering both wages and employment effects. We believe we are the first to do 
so in a panel regression format and using an instrumental variables (IV) approach to 
address the potential of endogeneity.  
 
The paper has two central findings. First, we show no evidence that high-technology 
industries reduce poverty, whether measured by the normal poverty line or by an 
indicator of ‘extreme’ poverty. Second, we demonstrate that there is an impact of high-
tech on the wages of non-degree educated workers. In short, our results suggest that 
there are, by and large, important benefits from attracting and/or generating high-tech 
employment on the wider urban economy in the US, but that these are not enough to 
reduce poverty and may come at the price of increased inequality.  
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The paper makes a number of contributions to the literature on ‘inclusive growth’ and 
the research investigating the extent to which economic development strategies benefit 
low-wage groups (e.g. Breau, Kogler, & Bolton, 2014; Donegan & Lowe, 2008; Fowler & 
Kleit, 2013; Lee, 2011; Lee & Rodríguez-Pose, 2013). It also makes a number of more 
specific contributions to the literature. It is the first to consider the influence of tech on 
poverty, focusing both on overall poverty and on the channels through which poverty 
may be reduced (i.e. new employment or higher wages).  It uses panel data, as well as an 
instrumental variable approach, addressing some concerns about endogeneity which may 
cause problems in cross-sectional work (Echeverri-Carroll & Ayala, 2009). Finally, it also 
contributes to the growing evidence reaped by geographers on the link between 
technological change and inequality (e.g. Rigby & Breau, 2008) 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section two considers the economic 
role of ‘tech’ and the potential ways in which the benefits of the sector may ‘trickle-
down’. Section three discusses the data and definitions of both tech-employment and 
poverty. Section four presents the model and a series of regression results on the link 
between tech and poverty. Section five considers the relationship with employment rates 
and wages for low-educated workers. Section six concludes with implications for 
research and practice. 
 
 
2. High-technology, growth, and poverty 
 
High-technology industries represent a growing share of GDP in many countries, 
including the US (Hathaway & Kallerman, 2012). The economic geography of these 
industries has been the subject of considerable research (Currid & Connolly, 2008), with 
the importance of tacit knowledge and the need to hire workers with highly specific and 
often unique skills meaning that firms in the high-tech sector tend to concentrate 
spatially in a limited number of cities (Bieri, 2010; Fallah et al., 2014). These are factors 
which have been known in academic and policy circles for some time and have triggered 
a race to create and attract high-tech firms as the formula for achieving local economic 
development and economic success. Many cities have consciously followed Florida’s 
(2002, 2005, 2014) three T’s recipe for economic development: ‘technology, talent, and 
5 
 
tolerance’. Cities that manage to attract technology and talent and brew a tolerant 
environment are more likely to become high tech hubs, replicating the success 
experienced in the last decades of the 20th century by the well-known cases of the Silicon 
Valley and Route 128, the two key tech-hubs in the US (Saxenian, 1994). While these two 
cases differ significantly from one another,1 they outline how the tech-industry, aligned 
with a supportive military, could create thriving economic clusters. Many cities the world 
over have put in place policies aiming to replicate their success. 
 
The key factor behind the multiplication of public policies aimed at promoting high-tech 
in cities is the increasingly strong evidence base on the importance of high-technology 
firms for wages and employment. These effects are both internal and external to the 
sector. Wages within the sector are high and employment has been growing for quite 
some time (Hall & Kahn, 2008; Hathaway & Kallerman, 2012). There may also be 
external wage or employment effects from tech employment into other sectors of the 
local economy. Explanations for these external effects have considered the potential of 
‘multiplier’ effects or cross-sectoral knowledge spillovers. But who exactly benefits from 
these external ‘multiplier’ effects? Do the benefits of the externalities from high-tech 
benefit the whole of society or only those with high-skills? Is there any evidence of high-
tech firms influencing the job opportunities and wages of those at the greatest risk of 
poverty in urban contexts? 
 
The idea that there are multiplier effects from the growth of one sector in a regional 
economy is a basic tenet of regional economics. Moretti (2010) and Moretti & Thulin 
(2013) recently applied this concept to the tech-sector. They suggested that growth in 
tradeable industries in a local economy may lead to knock-on growth in others, often 
non-tradeable sectors in the same local economy. These new jobs may be in supply 
chains or associated employment in personal services or retail, due to increased 
consumer demand. The largest multipliers, they find, are in high-technology industries – 
in part because of the affluence of the workers in this sector. According to their research, 
each additional tech-job in the local economy (narrowly defined as those in Machinery 
and Computing Equipment, Electrical Machinery, and Professional Equipment) is 
associated with the creation of a long-run additional 4.9 non-tradeable jobs.  
                                                        
1 Route 128 was structured around a few large firms, while Silicon Valley was based on a model 
of networked firms, with fewer large firms dominating (Saxenian, 1994). 
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Work in the literature on human capital spillovers has also begun to break down the 
processes driving these multipliers. Kaplanis (2010a; 2010b) suggested that the presence 
of high-skilled residents may have three effects: (1) it may increase consumption demand; 
(2) it can create production complementarities where low and high skilled workers aid 
each other in the labour market; and (3) it may create production spillovers, increasing 
productivity. These production spillovers have been the focus of considerable research. 
Rauch (1993) showed that high-skilled workers raised wages for other nearby workers, 
even when those workers were less skilled. Kaplanis (2010a; 2010b) used British data in 
order to demonstrate the existence of both increased wages and employment chances for 
low skilled workers in local labour markets with more skilled workers. 
 
Knowledge spillovers may be particularly important in urban environments in the case of 
high-tech industries (Fallah et al., 2014). Echeverri-Carroll and Ayala (2009), in particular, 
have indicated that there is an overall ‘tech-city wage premium’ in cities with high shares 
of tech-employment. Yet this premium is more likely to benefit those with higher skills, 
as it is larger for college-educated workers (6.4%) than for non-college educated workers 
(4.2%). As their research only presented an average effect across all non-college educated 
workers, it can be assumed that any premium may be even lower for those combining 
low skills with low incomes. There is also a potential selection bias as low skilled workers 
in ‘tech-cities’ may be more likely to be in employment, a factor that would bias down 
estimates of wages for other groups. Other work has also shown external wage effects 
from local concentrations of workers with Science, Technology, Engineering and Maths 
(STEM) degrees (Winters, 2014). 
 
These two effects – increased wages and increased employment – are the main 
mechanisms through which the strength of the local labour market effects may reduce 
poverty. Yet there is little direct evidence on the link between tech employment and 
poverty. In a related paper, Fowler & Kleit (2013) show that the presence of industrial 
clusters is associated with a lower poverty rate in non-metropolitan commuting zones, 
but not in metropolitan areas. Relative to rural areas, US cities offer greater economic 
opportunities and often have lower poverty rates (Fisher, 2007). 
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Other authors have considered the impact of the tech-sector on inequality. Florida and 
Mellander (2014) studied the determinants of wage inequality in a cross-section of US 
MSAs and found that the share of high-technology industries is a reliable predictor of 
wage inequality, if not income inequality. Panel studies have also unveiled a positive 
relationship between innovation and inequality for European regions (Lee & Rodríguez-
Pose, 2013; Lee, 2011) and Canadian cities (Breau et al., 2014). This was, however, not 
the case of US cities (Lee & Rodríguez-Pose, 2013), where higher levels of innovation 
were not connected to a rise in interpersonal inequality. This evidence, nevertheless, was 
based on an admittedly limited panel of US cities. 
 
In this paper we examine the effect of the presence of high-tech firms on those at the 
bottom of the pyramid, in terms of being at a greater risk of poverty, having low skills, or 
commanding the lowest wages. We analyse the weight of high-tech on both poverty and 
extreme poverty in a total of 295 US metropolitan regions over the period between 2005 
and 2011, as well as the connection between high-technology and levels of employment 
for those with limited formal qualifications.  
 
3. Data, variables and definitions 
 
The data 
The data are taken from American Community Survey (ACS) Microdata. The 
information is accessed via the IPUMS service at the University of Minnesota (Ruggles et 
al., 2010). The ACS is a large-scale annual survey of US households with a sample of 
more than 2 million individuals each year – essentially a (weighted) sample of 1 in 100 of 
the population (for more information on its strengths and limitations, see Spielman and 
Singleton, 2015). For this study, we use the microdata and construct indicators at the 
Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) level. However, data for one indicator – population 
– are not included in the ACS dataset. To address this, we amalgamate county level 
population data to the boundaries of ACS MSAs. Note that this is not a perfect process. 
as there are problems matching the population data  for two MSAs.2 Robustness tests 
show that the exclusion of these MSAs does not significantly alter the results. 
 
Measuring poverty 
                                                        
2 The MSAs we exclude are Grand Junction, CO & Hattiesburg, MS 
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The measure of poverty used in this research is the share of family units in the MSA 
whose income is below the poverty line, as defined by the US Social Security 
Administration. The unit is the family (for adults living alone the figure is given for the 
individual) and, as is standard, the data is weighted in order to take family size into 
account (the figure then being lower for individuals than parents of large families). The 
IPUMS data give family income as a share of the poverty line. Our core indicator is the 
poverty rate - the share of families with incomes below the official poverty line. The 
official poverty line in the US is defined according to a historic method based on 
availability of food, but uprated according to cost of living (although the cost of living 
does not vary by city). Data is equivalised according to both the size of family and 
number of resident children aged under 18 years old. 
 
The US poverty line is relatively tightly defined, there are important concerns that 
thresholds for poverty are low, arbitrary and lacking geographical variation (Greenberg, 
2009). To address these concerns and give a fuller indicator of how tech impacts on 
incomes, we also calculate measures for the share of families with incomes below each 
percentage of the poverty line (for example, share of families with an income below 
150% of the poverty line). Figure 1 depicts the distribution of households in poverty 
across US MSAs. The greatest incidence of poverty is found in southern states and, 
especially, in Texas. In this state McAllen-Edinburg-Mission, Brownsville-Harlingen, and 
Laredo topped the ranks in 2011 as the MSAs with the highest incidence of poverty 
(Figure 1). Urban poverty was also rife in other southern states and, most notably, 
Georgia, as well as in some of the rustbelt states, such as Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio. 
Some MSAs in California (e.g. Fresno and Visalia-Porterville) and Arizona also featured 
amongst those with the highest incidence of poverty in the country. By contrast, MSAs 
in the north-east – in a corridor expanding between Virginia Beach, Virginia, and 
Portland, Maine – were amongst those with the lowest levels of poverty in the country 
(Figure 1). 
 
Insert Figure 1 around here 
 
Given that our sample includes the great recession, it is also important to show how 
these change over time. The mean poverty rate across all cities in our sample stays 
relatively constant for the period 2005 -  2008 (it is 13.7% in 2005; 13.6% in 2008). But 
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there is then a sharp jump to 15.0% in 2009, 16.0% in 2010 and 16.5% in 2011. In 
contrast, the average share of tech changed little in the period. On average, 4.5% of 
employment was in tech in 2005, this peaked at 4.6% before the crisis but fell to only 
4.3% by 2011.   
 
To identify the potential channels through which tech-employment may benefit low-
education locals, we also test our models with two alternative indicators. The two main 
channels through which tech-employment may reduce poverty are through increased 
wages (consistent with a knowledge spillover explanation or simply one of increased local 
demand for labour) or job creation (consistent with ‘multipliers’). The two indicators are 
(3) wages for low skilled workers – defined as the mean wage for these workers and (4) 
the employment rate for low skilled workers. We define less educated workers as those 
without degree level qualifications.  
 
Defining the ‘high-tech’ economy 
There is no single definition of the high-tech economy. The US Bureau of Labour 
Statistics (Hecker, 2005) suggests four ways of identifying high-tech sectors: those with a 
high share of scientists, engineers and technicians in their workforces; high employment 
in Research and Development (R&D); those which produce high-tech products, or; 
those using high-tech production methods. Perhaps because of data limitations, the 
former approach has been most common. For example, Markusen et al. (1986) used an 
occupational definition, where ‘high-tech’ is identified as those industries with higher 
than average shares in occupations such as scientists, engineers, computer scientists, or 
geologists. Yet occupational approaches do not always produce intuitive definitions and 
even using objective criteria does not address the fact that some sectors (i.e. computing) 
seem more ‘tech’ than others (i.e. some parts of machinery) (Glasmeier, 1991). 
 
For the purpose of our analysis, we resort to an approach which has become common in 
academic and policy circles and adopt the definition used by Fallah et al. (2014), derived, 
in turn, from Hecker (2005). Fallah et al. (2014) identify five industrial categories – 
biotech, ICT services, ICT manufacturing, information tech and natural resources – as 
the components of a high-tech sector. We make some minor amendments to their 
definition. First, as our main concern is on the urban literature on ‘tech’, we exclude the 
natural resources component included in Fallah et al.’s (2014) definition,. Second, we 
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cannot perfectly match all sectors used in the definition because of differences in 
industry coding in the ACS. These differences are, however, small and are unlikely to 
affect the results. Full details on the definition of high-tech used are included in 
Appendix A. 
 
Insert Table 1 and Figure 2 around here 
 
 
Table 1 gives the list of the top and bottom ten high-tech cities in the US, as identified 
by our indicator. As would be expected given the literature on the geography of tech, 
there is a relatively uneven distribution of tech employment, with San Jose in California 
far higher than any other city in the country, with almost a quarter of all employment in 
high-tech sectors. Following this there is a set of other cities with strong tech-
employment, including Seattle-Everett and Nashua. Most high-tech cities in the US are 
located along a north-eastern corridor, running from Nashua in New Hampshire to 
Raleigh in North Carolina, as well as along the Pacific coast, from Seattle (Washington) 
to San Diego (California). There are, however, exceptions with some MSAs in the 
interior of the US with high levels of high-tech employment (Figure 2). These include 
Wichita (Kansas), Boulder (Colorado), Santa Fe (New Mexico), Cedar Rapids (Iowa), and 
Austin (Texas), which in 2011 were amongst the top 10 Tech cities in the US. Even more 
striking is the case of Huntsville (Alabama), which came third in the country on the basis 
of aerospace and military technology industries, as an oasis in an area mainly devoid of 
tech (Figure 2). Other relatively isolated MSAs with a large percentage of tech 
employment were Boise (Idaho), Rochester (Minnesota), Madison (Wisconsin), or Palm 
Bay (Florida). There is less of a clear pattern among the MSAs at the bottom of the tech 
classification, although many of them are concentrated in southern and Great Plains 
states and tend to be relatively small in size (Figure 2).  
 
Insert figures 3 – 7 around here 
 
What is the geography of our core variables? Figures 3 – 7 give scatterplots between the 
key variables of tech employment, poverty, and employment and wages for those 
without degrees. To identify geographical variation, we also consider MSA population as 
an additional variable. Figure 4 shows that larger cities tend to have higher shares of tech 
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employment, with a statistically significant and positive relationship (even when 
controlling for San Jose, the outlier). Larger cities also tend to have lower poverty rates, 
although the slope is shallower the relationship remains statistically significant (p<0.000). 
Figures 6 and 7 show the relationship between tech employment, and employment rates 
and wages for workers without degrees. They show that cities with greater shares of tech 
employment have higher wages but not higher employment rates for workers without 
degrees. Only the former relationship is statistically significant. 
 
 
4. Model, controls and results 
 
Model 
Our basic regression model links the share of high-technology employment in the local 
economy with household poverty. Because there are likely to be time-invariant city level 
factors which will affect our results, we estimate the models as fixed effects models. We 
also cluster the standard errors by MSA to adjust for serial correlation. The basic model 
is as follows: 
 
POVit = α + β1 TECHit + β2 EDUCit + β3 DEMOGit + β4 CITYSIZEit  
+ β5 MANit + ε + δ       (1) 
 
For each MSA ‘i’ where time ‘t’ is a year between 2005 – 2011. Where: 
POV is a measure of the share of households in either poverty or extreme 
poverty, 
TECH is the share of employment in high-technology sectors, 
EDUC is a measure of the share of the population with a 4 year degree, 
DEMOG is a set of demographic controls for gender, race, share of children in 
the population and migrants, 
CITYSIZE is the log of total population, 
MAN, is the share of employment in manufacturing. 
 
The time invariant error is ‘ε’ and the remaining error is ‘δ’. In addition, in all 
specifications we include year dummies. These should control for changes in the national 
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economy which will influence poverty rates. Table 2 provides the variable description 
and summary statistics for each of the variables included in the analysis. 
 
We also include year fixed effects in all models. This will control for cyclical changes in 
the US poverty rate and are particularly important given the rise in poverty rates 
associated with the great recession and documented above.  
 
When looking at the correlation between our two variables of interest – tech 
employment and poverty rates at MSA level – a simple correlation highlights a potential 
negative association between both. As depicted in Figure 3, in 2011 MSAs with a higher 
level of employment in tech also had lower rates of household poverty. This, however, 
may be a spurious relationship as other factors which may affect poverty need to be 
taken into account. 
 
Insert Figure 3 around here 
 
In addition, this correlation may be subject to a potential problem of endogeneity. This 
can happen if poverty is associated with reduced local demand, consequently lowering 
the potential of high-technology growth.  Another potential reason for endogeneity may 
be that growth in high-tech employment may lead to selective migration, attracting 
workers currently in poverty. To address this problem, we also resort to an instrumental 
variables (IV) approach. Our instrument is a version of the common shift-share 
instrument used by, amongst others, Ottaviano and Peri (2005) which builds on the likely 
association between initial industry share and subsequent growth. We take initial 
employment in each of the four ‘tech’ industries in 2005 and assume they grow according 
to the national rate of growth of each sector over the subsequent period. The variable is 
the predicted share of tech-employment in a city. This should be associated with tech-
growth, but unrelated to changes in poverty in the period.  
 
Control variables 
In addition to TECH, our control variables account for both demographic influences 
and influences related to the size or industrial structure of the city. We first control for 
the levels of human capital of the population with a variable for the share of the 
population with a 4-year degree. We expect this to be negatively associated with poverty 
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for two reasons. First, as they earn more cash those with high-skill levels are unlikely to 
be in poverty themselves – unless they remain unemployed for long periods of time. 
There may also be external effects from human capital on other parts of the urban labour 
market, with skilled workers creating jobs for others both directly (through 
entrepreneurship or within firms) and indirectly (via their higher spending in the local 
economy) (Heuermann, Halfdanarson, & Suedekum, 2010; Kaplanis, 2010a).  
 
We also control for migration which may also have dual effects. Migrants to the US tend 
to be polarised into both relatively high and relatively low education groups. Depending 
on the composition of the migrants, the expectations are for more low-skilled workers 
and, as a consequence, higher poverty rates. Migrants may also face discrimination in the 
labour market and find it harder to find high wage formal employment. This can occur 
even in high-tech industries: Hall and Kahn (2008) show immigrants in high-technology 
industries or occupations in Canada actually earn less than non-migrants. Yet in contrast, 
a growing body of evidence highlights the economic medium- and, increasingly, long-
term importance of migrants to cities and regions (Ottaviano & Peri, 2005; Rodríguez-
Pose & von Berlepsch, 2014, 2015). Migrants bring new ideas, can help build 
international links and are particularly likely to be motivated and entrepreneurial. They 
also transmit this dynamism and entrepreneurialism to the territories where they settled 
in the US (Rodríguez-Pose & von Berlepsch, 2014), leaving long-lasting economic 
benefits. Because of this dual effect, the impact of migration on poverty rates can be 
considered as ambiguous. 
 
An additional variable is the share of population who are non-white. Non-white groups 
may face discrimination in the labour market and there is a wide literature on the historic 
challenges faced by some non-whites in the United States (Wilson, 1987). Poverty rates 
are higher for non-whites (Macartney et al., 2013). To account for this, we also include a 
variable for the share of the population who are non-white.  
 
Chances of poverty vary through the life course. In particular, the period after having 
children is generally associated with poverty as having and raising children both (a) raise 
costs (for food and childcare), but can also (b) reduce labour force participation and job 
choice and, consequently, wages. Our use of an equivalised measure of poverty should 
address (a), but we nevertheless still expect a positive association between the share of 
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young people in the population and poverty. In contrast, wages and employment rates 
for males are generally higher than those for women in the US. We include a control for 
this to capture this association. 
 
Two city specific factors are also included in the analysis. The first is city size, measured 
as the log of total population. Larger cities may offer greater opportunities to enter the 
labour market and the density of economic activity is generally associated with higher 
productivity and wages. Greater job access and higher wages at the top end of the scale 
are likely to reduce poverty. Finally, the type of jobs available will shape poverty rates. 
While there are multiple sectors which could be investigated, the key sector in this 
context is manufacturing which is seen as offering well paid employment for relatively 
low skilled workers and has traditionally been associated with lower poverty rates. We 
therefore include a final control for the share of workers employed in manufacturing. 
This is calculated as all manufacturing employment, excluding those in the high-
technology manufacturing category. 
 
Results: Tech employment and poverty 
 
Table 3 presents the results of the first set of regressions which consider the relationship 
between tech employment and poverty. Columns 1 – 3 introduce the results of the fixed 
effects panel data estimations. Column 1 displays the association between the percentage 
of tech employment and the percentage of households in poverty in US MSAs; column 2 
includes a number of demographic controls into the estimation; while column 3 adds the 
controls for city size and industrial structure. Columns 4 – 6 repeat the same structure 
for the IV analysis, using the shift share variable as instrument. All models include year 
dummies and are estimated with fixed effects. 
 
Insert Table 3 around here 
 
The main finding of the analysis is the lack of relationship between employment in tech 
and poverty. The relationship is negative in the fixed effects specifications, while it 
becomes positive in the IV. In neither case the coefficients are significant, meaning that 
tech employment does not seem to have an influence on the levels of household poverty 
experience in US cities. In contrast to the expectations of the optimistic literature, it does 
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not appear that increasing tech employment in a city is associated with any meaningful 
reduction in poverty. This finding is reinforced by the strength of our instrument in the 
IV regressions. The predicted share of tech-employment in a city appears to be a good 
predictor of subsequent increases in poverty – the Kleibergen-Paap test, (considered the 
best indicator of instrument validity when using robust standard errors) is above the 
threshold values and far above the rule of thumb indicator of 10. Yet the IV results do 
not significantly alter those of the fixed effect panel data analysis, reinforcing the idea of 
a lack of association between tech-employment and poverty.3 
 
The control variables by contrast, do yield some sights into the determinants of urban 
poverty in the US. First and foremost, human capital matters for poverty. The share of 
the population with a degree is associated with reduced poverty and this coefficient 
remains negative and significant in the IV analysis, implying that the higher the 
percentage of the population with a university degree, the lower the likelihood of poverty 
affecting cities in America. In contrast, high concentrations of children are, as expected, 
associated with higher urban poverty levels. There is no relationship between migration, 
gender, and industrial structure and urban household poverty. 
 
The lack of association between the overall household poverty and tech employment 
may not necessarily mean that there is no connection whatsoever between both 
phenomena. It may be the case that tech employment can be increasing wages for the 
very poorest – potentially dragging households and individuals out of extreme poverty, 
without generating enough additional income to take them over the poverty line. To test 
whether this is the case in Table 4 repeats the regressions in Table 3, considering only 
with a measure of extreme poverty – the percentage of households below 75% of the 
poverty line – is our dependent variable. 
 
Insert Table 4 around here 
 
                                                        
3 A reviewer makes the sensible point that there may be a non-linearity in the relationship 
between tech and poverty. We experiment with a variety of model specifications to 
investigate this possibility, but cannot find such a relationship.  A second challenge is 
that year on year variation may not be sufficient for any relationship to be apparent. 
However, estimating the regressions using only the end years of the period does not alter 
the results significantly. 
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As before, the insignificant coefficients for the tech employment variable underline the 
absence of a robust relationship between tech and poverty, regardless of the threshold of 
poverty considered. The control variables perform similarly as in Table 3 (extreme 
poverty declines with the percentage of the population with higher education and 
increases with the share of children living in a city), but, despite an increase in the size of 
the coefficient, any effect of tech employment on poverty remains trivial.  
 
5. Wages and employment for the non-degree educated  
 
While our results do not show any impact of tech-employment on poverty overall, there 
may be other mechanisms through which tech affects the low-skilled urban labour 
market, especially through its potential influence on wages and levels of employment for 
those at the bottom of the pyramid. We attempt to isolate these effects in Tables 5 and 6. 
Table 5 assesses the relationship between low skilled wages and tech-employment; Table 
6 consists of the same model with low skilled employment rates as the dependent 
variable. The tables follow exactly the same structure as Tables 3 and 4. Kaplanis (2010b) 
identifies three ways in which skilled workers may affect the salaries and employment of 
low skilled workers: consumption demand, production complementarities, or production 
spillovers. Similarly, Moretti (2010) shows that the presence of tech-multipliers will 
spread throughout society. In each case, the result would be felt in terms of either 
increased wages or increased employment for low-qualified workers. In both cases we 
use workers with low qualifications, as these are most likely to be at risk of poverty and 
least likely to be working in tech. 
 
Insert Table 5 around here 
 
Table 5 considers the relationship between tech employment and wages for non-degree 
educated workers.4 We focus on these groups for two reasons: less well educated workers 
are more likely to be in poverty, and they are less likely to work in high-tech sectors. In 
contrast to the results with household poverty as the dependent variable (Tables 3 and 4), 
we find a positive and statistically significant relationship between tech employment and 
the hourly wages for non-degree educated workers. Regardless of the number of controls 
included in the analysis and of the method used, the coefficient for tech employment is 
                                                        
4 We focus on those qualified below Associate Degree level.   
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always positive and significant, meaning that in US cities with a high degree of tech 
employment, the salaries of the less educated workers tend to be higher than in cities 
where this is not the case (Table 5).  So while the effects of tech do not seem to reach 
those in poverty or extreme poverty, they do affect the wages of those with the lowest 
level of education. In our basic specification (Table 5, Column 1), a 1 percent increase in 
tech employment in a city is associated with a 2.9 percent increase in wages for non-
degree educated workers. The IV analysis reduces the effect to levels of 1.9 percent 
(Table 5, Columns 4-6), but the coefficients always point to the existence of a solidly 
robust and positive causal relationship between cities with a greater share of tech 
employment and increases in the wages of those with the lowest levels of education. 
 
The controls in the IV analysis indicate that the wages of those with the lowest level of 
education in urban America are affected by factors which are not always the same as 
those influencing poverty levels. While the percentage of the population with a university 
degree is no longer significant, in what seems to be a reproduction of the traditional 
‘male breadwinner’ model, the wages of those at the bottom of the pyramid are positively 
affected by the percentage of children in a city, the percentage of men, and the share of 
manufacturing (Table 5, Columns 4-6). 
 
 
Insert Table 6 around here 
 
The results for employment are more nuanced (Table 6). There has been considerable 
discussion of the potential for ‘tech multipliers’ with multiplier jobs being created in jobs 
with strong tech economies. Our fixed effects results support this interpretation to some 
degree, with a positive and statistically significant relationship between tech employment 
and the employment rate for less well educated workers. Yet the IV does not support 
this interpretation. All IV coefficients for tech employment remain positive, but become 
not significant (Table 6). 
 
 
7. Conclusions 
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High-tech has been traditionally regarded by academics and policymakers alike as a key 
factor behind urban growth and development. Cities not only in the US, but across the 
world, have become engaged in races to make the city more high-tech (Rodríguez-Pose 
and Hardy, 2014). However, the impact of the presence of high tech on those at the 
bottom of the pyramid is still poorly understood. While we know little about how high-
tech affects urban inequality, we know next to nothing about its impact on overall 
poverty. On the one hand, an optimistic body of research heralds high-technology 
industries as having the potential to help urban economies thrive, but also to raise wages 
and reduce poverty. On the other, a more pessimistic set of studies highlights the 
potential difficulties of tech-led urban growth: that the benefits of the sector may be 
skewed, and that the result of growth in the tech-sector may not trickle-down to those at 
risk of poverty. This paper has tested these ideas with using a panel of US cities over the 
period 2005 – 2011, a period which saw significant increases in poverty but a relatively 
resilient tech sector. Our results reveal a more complex and nuanced picture. While 
technology industries are associated with rising wages for low skilled workers, the 
benefits of tech on wages are not enough to reduce the poverty rate. Tech alone does not 
seem to be a remedy for those living in poverty, let alone in extreme poverty in urban 
environments in the US.  
 
The results have some significant implications for policy. For local economic 
development practitioners, chasing tech-employment may lead to aggregate gains, but – 
if it is to reach deprived groups – needs to be combined with efforts to ensure these 
gains are widely shared. Options for doing this might include skills training or targeted 
support to help those in poverty into employment. There has been renewed interest in 
geographical dimensions of policy to address low pay and precarity (Wills and Linneker, 
2014). The localised nature of tech-growth suggests an important policy area in linking 
employment growth with disadvantaged groups. This will vary according to specific local 
geographical variation in labour markets and patterns of transport and housing. These 
results also provide some challenges for tech firms. Given the growing scale of the 
sector, its resources and – in many cases – the profitability of tech firms, there is clearly 
more which could be done by tech-firms to help address poverty in the local economies 
in which they are based. 
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This paper has made a number of contributions to the literature on the gains from 
growth, yet it opens up a number of potential future areas for research. First, our data 
includes a period of significant economic crisis. While we can control for this using time 
fixed effects, one extension would be to develop a panel with a longer time period. 
Second, our results are at an aggregate level – other work may want to dig into the 
microdata to investigate the relationships which are driving wage growth but not poverty 
reduction (for example, by considering the types of group who benefit from growth in 
the tech sector. Linking longitudinal individual level data with local economic 
characteristics would be a good way of doing this. A fourth useful extension would be to 
correct out indicator of poverty for cost of living in a manner such as that used by 
Essletzbichler (2015). Finally, our research is for the United States – a relatively high-
tech, high-poverty economy – future research may wish to test if these results apply in 
different economic and institutional circumstances.  
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Figure 1. Households in poverty in US MSAs (%), 2011  
 
Source: American Community Survey via IPUMS. 
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Figure 2. Employment in high-technology industries in US MSAs (%), 2011  
 
Source: American Community Survey via IPUMS. 
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Figure 3. Tech employment and poverty rates, 2011 
 
 
Figure 4. Tech employment and MSA population, 2011 
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Figure 5. Poverty rates and MSA population, 2011 
 
 
Figure 6. Tech employment and wages for non-degree educated workers, 2011 
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Figure 7. Tech employment and employment rates for non-degree educated workers, 
2011 
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Table 1. High-tech and low-tech cities, 2011 
 
Rank MSA % tech 
employment 
Rank MSA % tech 
employment 
1. San Jose, CA 24.1 286. Abilene, TX 1.4 
2. Seattle-Everett, WA 13.8 287. Atlantic City, NJ 1.3 
3. Nashua, NH 13.5 288. Monroe, LA 1.2 
4. Huntsville, AL 13.5 289. Bloomington, IN 1.1 
5. Wichita, KS 13.0 290. Merced, CA 0.9 
6. Lowell, MA/NH 12.4 291. Waterloo-Cedar Falls, IA 0.8 
7. Boulder-Longmont, CO 12.1 292. Laredo, TX 0.7 
8. Santa Fe, NM 11.6 293. Yakima, WA 0.7 
9. Cedar Rapids, IA 10.4 294. Jacksonville, NC 0.6 
10. Austin, TX 10.4 295. Alexandria, LA 0.5 
Mean: 4.3% 
Source: American Community Survey.  
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Table 2. Variable description and summary statistics, 2011 
 Obs Mean St Dev Min Max 
Poverty rate (%) 295  0.16   0.05   0.06   0.38  
Low skilled wage rate ($) 295  29,198   3,394  18,594  41,356  
Low skilled employment rate (%) 295  0.86   0.04   0.74   0.95  
% Tech employment 295  0.04   0.03   0.01   0.24  
% Not US born 295  0.10   0.08   0.01   0.49  
% Non white 295  0.18   0.12   0.02   0.77  
% of pop <16  295  0.28   0.03   0.21   0.39  
% of pop male 295  0.52   0.01   0.48   0.59  
% with degree 295  0.24  0.07   0.08   0.51  
Population  295  881,850  1,315,988   43,055   9,889,025  
% Manufacturing Emp  295  0.08   0.05   0.00   0.35  
Source: American Community Survey, except Population which is developed through county data via the 
American FactFinder. 
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Table 3. Tech-employment and poverty - Regression results  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable: Households in poverty (%), ln 
Estimation method Fixed 
effects 
Fixed 
effects 
Fixed 
effects 
IV IV IV 
       
Tech employment (%) -0.0133 -0.00695 -0.00536 0.190 0.169 0.153 
 (0.0229) (0.0229) (0.0232) (0.167) (0.160) (0.159) 
% with degree (ln)  -0.169*** -0.170***  -0.192*** -0.191*** 
  (0.0475) (0.0471)  (0.0547) (0.0538) 
% Not US born (ln)  -0.00436 -0.00585  -0.00443 -0.00602 
  (0.0245) (0.0247)  (0.0245) (0.0246) 
% Non white (ln)  -0.00559 -0.00552  -0.00395 -0.00407 
  (0.0106) (0.0103)  (0.0113) (0.0108) 
% of pop <16 (ln)  0.212 0.237*  0.245* 0.269** 
  (0.131) (0.130)  (0.126) (0.126) 
Male (%)  -0.194 -0.184  -0.329 -0.304 
  (0.463) (0.454)  (0.466) (0.460) 
Population (ln)   -0.457**   -0.483** 
   (0.189)   (0.190) 
Manufacturing % (ln)   0.00934   0.0136 
   (0.0243)   (0.0248) 
Constant -2.075*** -1.954*** 4.039    
 (0.0532) (0.325) (2.535)    
       
Observations 2,065 2,065 2,065 2,065 2,065 2,065 
R-squared 0.347 0.355 0.359 0.306 0.324 0.334 
Number of MSA 295 295 295 295 295 295 
KP Wald F-test    27.540 20.214 20.251 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Estimated as fixed effects models (columns 1 – 3) or using an instrumental variable (4 – 6) with 
robust standard errors (in parentheses). Standard errors clustered by metropolitan statistical area 
(MSA). All models include year dummies. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 4. Different levels of poverty and tech employment, Instrumental Variable Results 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
 Percentage households below each percent of poverty line: 
Dependent variable 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% Poverty 
line 
110% 120% 130% 140% 150% 160% 170% 180% 190% 200% 
                 
Tech employment (%) 0.382 0.418 0.0349* 0.0196 0.0295 0.0321 0.0205 0.0144 0.0106 -0.119 -0.201* -0.0122 -0.164 -0.198* -0.216** -0.211** 
 (0.288) (0.274) (0.0200) (0.0204) (0.0212) (0.0221) (0.0218) (0.0227) (0.0229) (0.108) (0.108) (0.0250) (0.107) (0.109) (0.105) (0.0948) 
% with degree (ln) -
0.259*** 
-
0.259*** 
-
0.0302*** 
-
0.0311*** 
-
0.0373*** 
-
0.0385*** 
-
0.0380*** 
-
0.0400*** 
-
0.0463*** 
-
0.173*** 
-
0.153*** 
-
0.0528*** 
-
0.156*** 
-
0.146*** 
-
0.145*** 
-
0.150*** 
 (0.0905) (0.0888) (0.00849) (0.00826) (0.00902) (0.00915) (0.00886) (0.00886) (0.00921) (0.0396) (0.0378) (0.00923) (0.0330) (0.0328) (0.0308) (0.0288) 
% Not US born (ln) -0.0131 -0.0113 -0.000793 -0.000440 -0.00154 -0.00148 -0.000137 0.000638 0.000582 -0.0104 -0.00587 -0.00169 -0.0115 -0.0119 -0.0120 -0.0159 
 (0.0322) (0.0323) (0.00262) (0.00251) (0.00267) (0.00303) (0.00296) (0.00297) (0.00301) (0.0140) (0.0152) (0.00325) (0.0131) (0.0126) (0.0123) (0.0113) 
% Non-White (ln) 0.00204 0.00580 0.00207 0.00171 0.00174 0.00191 0.00209 0.00210 0.00114 -0.00301 -0.00284 0.00127 -
0.000669 
0.00125 0.00225 0.00106 
 (0.0149) (0.0143) (0.00139) (0.00151) (0.00157) (0.00165) (0.00176) (0.00175) (0.00177) (0.00798) (0.00746) (0.00173) (0.00675) (0.00658) (0.00627) (0.00599) 
% of pop <16 (ln) 0.259 0.289 0.0314* 0.0323* 0.0382** 0.0414** 0.0338* 0.0352* 0.0363* 0.103 0.0838 0.0295 0.0541 0.0648 0.0731 0.0809 
 (0.191) (0.178) (0.0170) (0.0186) (0.0193) (0.0193) (0.0205) (0.0190) (0.0199) (0.0926) (0.0945) (0.0193) (0.0807) (0.0771) (0.0740) (0.0718) 
Male (%) -0.216 -0.493 2.08e-06 -0.00460 -0.0550 -0.0410 -0.0628 -0.0485 -0.0710 -0.263 -0.209 -0.0608 -0.168 -0.139 -0.116 -0.135 
 (0.670) (0.618) (0.0549) (0.0638) (0.0639) (0.0662) (0.0711) (0.0729) (0.0696) (0.345) (0.343) (0.0730) (0.297) (0.298) (0.284) (0.261) 
Population (ln) -0.506** -0.495** -0.0269 -0.0490* -0.0474* -0.0525* -0.0484 -0.0515 -0.0595* -0.337** -0.364** -0.0890** -
0.407*** 
-
0.406*** 
-
0.392*** 
-
0.400*** 
 (0.248) (0.247) (0.0255) (0.0282) (0.0285) (0.0294) (0.0308) (0.0315) (0.0318) (0.153) (0.145) (0.0355) (0.134) (0.128) (0.120) (0.106) 
Manufacturing % (ln) 0.0418 0.0632** 0.00438 0.00256 0.000506 0.000224 0.00101 0.000847 0.000572 -0.00313 -0.00327 -0.00148 -0.00821 -0.00707 -0.00347 -0.00692 
 (0.0313) (0.0316) (0.00277) (0.00315) (0.00377) (0.00384) (0.00396) (0.00394) (0.00400) (0.0199) (0.0189) (0.00425) (0.0170) (0.0158) (0.0157) (0.0140) 
                 
Observations 2,065 2,065 2,065 2,065 2,065 2,065 2,065 2,065 2,065 2,065 2,065 2,065 2,065 2,065 2,065 2,065 
R-squared 0.332 0.280 0.255 0.294 0.302 0.293 0.327 0.343 0.346 0.383 0.339 0.392 0.364 0.370 0.333 0.335 
Number of metaread 295 295 295 295 295 295 295 295 295 295 295 295 295 295 295 295 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Estimated as fixed effects instrumental variable model with robust standard errors (in parentheses). All models include year dummies.  
IV = shift-share based on growth in tech sub-sectors. Kleibergen-Paap F statistic = 18.672 for all models.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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Table 5. Tech employment and wage for non-degree educated workers 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable: Hourly wage for non-degree educated workers (ln) 
Estimation method Fixed 
effects 
Fixed 
effects 
Fixed 
effects 
IV IV IV 
       
Tech employment (%) 0.0288*** 0.0261*** 0.0262*** 0.193*** 0.178*** 0.182*** 
 (0.00948) (0.00958) (0.00940) (0.0702) (0.0655) (0.0655) 
% with degree (ln)  0.0209 0.0222  0.000972 0.00190 
  (0.0206) (0.0207)  (0.0259) (0.0260) 
% Not US born (ln)  0.00252 0.00284  0.00246 0.00268 
  (0.00785) (0.00777)  (0.00966) (0.00966) 
% Non-White (ln)  -0.00912** -0.00937**  -0.00770* -0.00796* 
  (0.00435) (0.00436)  (0.00462) (0.00470) 
% of pop <16 (ln)  0.0619 0.0504  0.0911** 0.0812* 
  (0.0395) (0.0398)  (0.0436) (0.0449) 
Male (%)  0.740*** 0.748***  0.623*** 0.630*** 
  (0.152) (0.154)  (0.180) (0.183) 
Population (ln)   0.128*   0.102 
   (0.0728)   (0.0783) 
Manufacturing % (ln)   0.0194**   0.0236*** 
   (0.00757)   (0.00900) 
Constant 10.27*** 9.985*** 8.355***    
 (0.0216) (0.103) (0.951)    
       
Observations 2,065 2,065 2,065 2,065 2,065 2,065 
R-squared 0.337 0.356 0.360 0.152 0.198 0.195 
Number of MSA 295 295 295 295 295 295 
KP Wald F-test    18.428 18.657 18.672 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Estimated as fixed effects models (columns 1 – 3) or using an instrumental variable (4 – 6) with 
robust standard errors (in parentheses). Standard errors clustered by metropolitan statistical area 
(MSA). All models include year dummies. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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Table 6. Tech employment and the employment rate for non-degree educated workers 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable: Employment rate, non-degree educated workers (ln) 
Estimation method Fixed 
effects 
Fixed 
effects 
Fixed 
effects 
IV IV IV 
       
Tech employment 
(%) 
0.00984** 0.00829* 0.00817* 0.0399 0.0305 0.0313 
 (0.00471) (0.00459) (0.00460) (0.0327) (0.0319) (0.0317) 
% with degree (ln)  0.0146 0.0147  0.0117 0.0116 
  (0.0109) (0.0110)  (0.0123) (0.0123) 
% Not US born (ln)  0.00601 0.00611  0.00600 0.00609* 
  (0.00377) (0.00375)  (0.00371) (0.00369) 
% Non White (ln)  -
0.00713*** 
-
0.00712*** 
 -
0.00692*** 
-
0.00691*** 
  (0.00240) (0.00239)  (0.00243) (0.00242) 
% of pop <16 (ln)  -0.00634 -0.00789  -0.00204 -0.00331 
  (0.0269) (0.0272)  (0.0275) (0.0279) 
Male (%)  0.234** 0.233**  0.217** 0.215** 
  (0.0980) (0.0974)  (0.101) (0.100) 
Population (ln)   0.0302   0.0264 
   (0.0414)   (0.0416) 
Manufacturing % 
(ln) 
  -0.00132   -0.000698 
   (0.00513)   (0.00512) 
Constant -0.0833*** -0.180*** -0.578    
 (0.0109) (0.0660) (0.550)    
       
Observations 2,065 2,065 2,065 2,065 2,065 2,065 
R-squared 0.599 0.607 0.608 0.588 0.601 0.601 
Number of MSA 295 295 295 295 295 295 
KP Wald F-test    18.428 18.657 18.672 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Estimated as fixed effects models (columns 1 – 3) or using an instrumental variable (4 – 6) with 
robust standard errors (in parentheses). Standard errors clustered by metropolitan statistical area 
(MSA). All models include year dummies. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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Appendix A1. Definition of high-tech employment in ACS 
Definition used by 
Fallah et al. (2014) 
  Our 
definition 
 
NAICS code Definition ACS Code Definition 
Biotechnology    
3254 Pharmaceutical and medicine manufacturing 3254 Pharmaceutical and medicine manufacturing 
Natural resources    
1131,1132 Forestry -  
2111 Oil and gas extraction -  
3241 Petroleum and coal products manufacturing -  
Information    
5415 Computer systems design and related services 5415 Computer systems design and related services 
3333 Commercial and service industry machinery manufacturing 3333 Commercial and service industry machinery manufacturing 
3342 Communications equipment manufacturing 334M1 Communications, audio, and video equipment (3342, 3343) 
3344 Semiconductor and other electronic component manufacturing 
 
334M2 
 
Electronic components and products, n.e.c.  
 
3345 Navigational, measuring, electromedical and control instruments 
manufacturing 
3345 Navigational, measuring, electromedical, and control instruments 
5112 Software publishers 5112 Software publishing 
5161 Internet publishing and broadcasting 5161  
5179 Other telecommunications 517Z 
 
Other telecommunication services (2003-2007) 
Telecommunications, except wired telecommunications carriers (2008-onward) 
5181 Internet service providers and Web search portals 5181 Internet service providers and Web search portals 
5182 Data processing, hosting and related services 5182  
3343 Audio and video equipment manufacturing 334M1 Communications, audio, and video equipment  
3346 Manufacturing and reproducing, magnetic and optical media 334M2 
 
Electronic components and products, n.e.c.  
4234 Professional and commercial equipment and supplies, merchant wholesalers 4234 Professional and commercial equipment and supplies 
5416 Management, scientific and technical consulting services 5416 Management, scientific and technical consulting services  
5171 Wired telecommunications carriers 5171 Wired telecommunications carriers 
5172 Wireless telecommunications carriers (except satellite) 
 
5172 Included as 5179 
5173 Telecommunications resellers 5173 Included as 5179 
5174 Satellite telecommunications 5174 Professional and commercial equipment and supplies 
8112 Electronic and precision equipment repair and maintenance 8112 Electronic and precision equipment repair and maintenance 
Manufacturing    
3341 Computer and peripheral equipment manufacturing 
 
3341 Computer and peripheral equipment 
 manufacturing 
3254 Pharmaceutical and medicine manufacturing 3254 Pharmaceuticals and medicines 
3251 Basic chemical manufacturing 325M Industrial and miscellaneous chemicals (also 3259) 
3252 Resin, synthetic rubber and artificial synthetic fibers and filaments 3252 Resin, synthetic rubber and artificial synthetic fibers and filaments manufacturing 
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 manufacturing   
3255 Paint, coating and adhesive manufacturing 3255 Paint, coating and adhesive manufacturing 
3259 Other chemical products and preparation manufacturing 325M Industrial and miscellaneous chemicals (also 3251) 
3332 Industrial machinery manufacturing 333M Machinery n.e.c. (3332, 3334 & 3339) 
3333 Commercial and service industry machinery manufacturing 3333 Commercial and service industry machinery 
3336 Engine, turbine and power transmission equipment manufacturing 3336 Engine, turbine and power transmission equipment manufacturing 
3339 Other general purpose machinery manufacturing 333M Machinery, n.e.c. (3332, 3334, 3339) 
3341 Computer and peripheral equipment manufacturing 3341 Computer and peripheral equipment manufacturing 
3342 Communications equipment manufacturing 334M1 Communications, audio, and video equipment( 3342, 3343) 
3343 Audio and video equipment manufacturing 334M1 Communications, audio, and video equipment( 3342, 3343) 
3344 Semiconductor and other electronic component manufacturing 334M2 Electronic components and products, n.e.c (3344, 3346) 
 
3345 Navigational, measuring, electromedical and control instruments 
manufacturing 
3345 Navigational, measuring, electromedical and control instruments manufacturing 
 
3346 Manufacturing and reproducing, magnetic and optical media 334M2 Electronic components and products, n.e.c (3344, 3346) 
3353 Electrical equipment manufacturing 
 
335M Electrical machinery, equipment, and supplies, n.e.c. (2003-2007) 
Electric lighting, and electrical equipment manufacturing, and other electrical component manufacturing, n.e.c. 
(2008-onward), (3351, 3353, 3359) 
3364 Aerospace product and parts manufacturing 
 
33641M1 
33641M2 
Aircraft and parts (336411-336413 
Aerospace products and parts (336414-336419) 
3369 Other transportation equipment manufacturing 3369 Other transportation equipment 
3241 Petroleum and coal products manufacturing 32411 
3241M 
Petroleum refining (32411) 
Miscellaneous petroleum and coal products (32412, 32419) 
3253 Pesticide, fertilizer and other agricultural chemical manufacturing 3253 Agricultural chemicals 
Services    
4234 Professional and commercial equipment and supplies, merchant wholesalers 4234 Professional and commercial equipment and supplies, merchant wholesalers 
4861 Pipeline transportation of crude oil 486 Pipeline transportation 
4862 Pipeline transportation of natural gas 486 Pipeline transportation 
4869 Other pipeline transportation 486 Pipeline transportation 
5112 Software publishers 5112 Software publishers 
5161 Internet publishing and broadcasting 5161 Internet publishing and broadcasting 
5171 Wired telecommunications carriers 5171 Wired telecommunications carriers 
5172 Wireless telecommunications carriers (except satellite) 
 
517Z 
 
Other telecommunication services (2003-2007) or Telecommunications, except wired telecommunications 
carriers (2008-onward) (5133 exc. 51331) 
5173 Telecommunications resellers 
 
517Z 
 
Other telecommunication services (2003-2007) or Telecommunications, except wired telecommunications 
carriers (2008-onward) (5133 exc. 51331) 
5174 Satellite telecommunications 
 
517Z 
 
Other telecommunication services (2003-2007) or Telecommunications, except wired telecommunications 
carriers (2008-onward) (5133 exc. 51331) 
5179 Other telecommunications 
 
517Z 
 
Other telecommunication services (2003-2007) or Telecommunications, except wired telecommunications 
carriers (2008-onward) (5133 exc. 51331) 
5181 Internet service providers and Web search portals 5181 Internet service providers and Web search portals 5181 
5182 Data processing, hosting and related services 5182 Data processing, hosting and related services 
5211 Software publishers 5112 Software publishing  
5232 Securities and commodity exchanges 52M2 Securities, commodities, funds, trusts, and other financial investments (523, 525)  
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5413 Architectural, engineering and related services 5413 Architectural, engineering, and related services 
5415 Computer systems design and related services 5415 Computer systems design and related services 
5416 Management, scientific and technical consulting services 5416 Management, scientific and technical consulting services 
5417 Scientific research and development services 5417 Scientific research and development services 
5511 Management of companies and enterprises 55 Management of companies and enterprises 
5612 Facilities support services 561M Other administrative, and other support services (5611, 5612, 5619) 
8112 Electronic and precision equipment repair and maintenance 8112 Electronic and precision equipment repair and maintenance 
 
 
